Sleeping Drivers in Tort Law by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 20
Fall 9-1-1963
Sleeping Drivers in Tort Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sleeping Drivers in Tort Law, 20 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 370 (1963),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol20/iss2/20
370 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
plaintiff examined when the court, in its discretion, considers this to
be necessary.
27
While a few jurisdictions continue to deny courts the power to
order the examination of a plaintiff in a personal injury action,2s
jurisdictions adhering to the majority view, have begun to extend
the principle of granting the examination. The extent to which some
jurisdictions have gone is illustrated in Friedrichsen v. Niemotka.2 9
A father sued for medical expenses and loss of services of an infant
injured in an automobile accident allegedly attributable to the de-
fendant's negligence. The defendant moved for an order requiring
the child to submit to a neurological examination. This motion was
granted even though the infant was not a party to the action.
The rule denying courts the power to order a physical examination,
though once considered sound,30 is no longer tenable. The finder of
fact, whether judge or jury, must determine the merits of the plain-
tiff's case and to do this the best evidence available should be put
before it. Any competent evidence which will better apprise the court
and the defendant of the nature and extent of the plaintiff's cause
should be considered. The best evidence available is often that which
is obtainable by physical examination of the plaintiff, and when such
examination is deemed necessary courts should not be fettered by
archaic theories which maintain that physical examination amounts
to a trespass to the person.
RiCHARD J. Tress
SLEEPING DRIVERS IN TORT LAW
Until the late 1962 decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,' the rule had seemed
to be well-settled that falling asleep at the wheel is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case of negligence.2 Theisen went one step
2 Virginia Linen Serv., Inc. v. Allen, 198 Va. 7oo, 96 S.E.2d 86 (1957). The
court added that it may require counsel to suggest or furnish a list of qualified
physicians from which the court might choose one to perform the examination.
£Supra note 7.
'971 N.J. Super. 398, 177 A.2d 58 (1962).
n0Supra note 8.
'118 Wisc. 2d 91, ns8 N.W.2d 140 (1962).
'Whiddon v. Malone, 220 Ala. 22o, 124 So. 516 (1929); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Morris, 78 Ariz. 24, 275 P.2d 38 9 (1954); Bushnell v. Bushnell, io 3 Conn.
583, 131 Ad. 432 (1925); Gendron v. Gendron, 144 Me. 347, 69 A.2d 668 (1949);
Cox v. Babington, 166 Neb. 609, 9o N.W.2d 64 (1958); Savard v. Randall, 103 N.H.
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further and held that falling asleep at the wheel constitutes negli-
gence as a matter of law.
In this direct action against the insurance company, authorized by
Wisconsin law, by a guest to recover damages for personal injuries
caused by his host, the plaintiff established that the operator had
fallen asleep at the wheel. 3 The trial court excluded testimony relating
to the driver's physical activities on the evening of the accident, which
the defendant offered with a view to proving that the driver went
to sleep, unintentionally, from physical exhaustion. After refusing the
plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of the driver's neg-
ligence, the trial court applied the prevailing doctrine and submitted
the issue to the jury.
The jury found the driver causally negligent. On appeal the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin held "that falling asleep at the wheel is
negligence as a matter of law because no facts can exist which will
justify, excuse, or exculpate such negligence" 4 although the court
reversed and remanded on another point.
There are two significant limitations on the scope of this decision:
(1) The fact of falling asleep establishes only ordinary negligence as a
matter of law. Gross or wanton negligence requires additional proof;5
(2) the decision does not cover loss of consciousness as distinguished
from going to sleep. The court excluded from the "negligence as a
matter of law" rule "those exceptional cases of loss of consciousness
resulting from injury inflicted by an outside force or fainting or
heart attack .... or other illness which suddenly incapacitates the
driver of an automobile and when the occurrence of such disability
is not attended with sufficient warning or should not have been reason-
ably foreseen."0
As stated previously, the generally accepted view in the United
States7 is that the mere fact of going to sleep at the wheel justifies
234, 169 A.2d 276 (1961); Baird v. Baird, 223 N.C. 73o, 28 S.E.2d 225 (1943);
Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. 263 Wis. 633, 58
N.W.2d 424 (1953).
'There was no evidence that the driver had a fainting spell, epileptic seizure,
or other unforeseeable attack which caused him to lose consciousness.
1iS N.W.2d at 144. A new trial was granted because of the trial court's im-
proper instructions which cast the question of negligence in assumption of risk
language and consequently could have confused the jury.
rSee note 8, infra.
0118 N.W.2d at 144. According to the overwhelming weight of authority an
operator is not, under these circumstances, liable for negligence. See Shirks Motor
Express v. Oxenham, 20o4 Md. 626, 1o6 A.2d 46 (1954); Holmes v. McNeil, 356 Mo.
846, 204 S.W.2d 303 (1947); Whelpley v. Frye, i9g Ore. 530, 263 P.2d 295 (1953);
Keller v. Wonn, 140 W.Va. 86o, 87 S.E.2d 453 (1955).
'See cases cited note 2, supra.
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an inference of ordinary negligences sufficient to establish a prima
facie 9 case. The prima facie rule is well-established in Virginia.10 Such
negligence is predicated on the failure of the driver to conform to
a socially acceptable standard of due care," and although the language
of the opinions varies somewhat, the holdings are the same. WArhen an
automobile operator falls asleep at the wheel, some courts speak in
terms of "inference" or "permissible inference" of negligence;' 2 other
courts speak of a rebuttable presumption 13 of negligence. 14 Initially,
the plaintiff has the burden of producing some evidence that the
driver fell asleep. If the evidence, whether direct or by permissible
inference, tends to establish that fact, such evidence, if unrebutted,
justifies a verdict for the plaintiff. 5 Some jurisdictions will apply the
evidence rule of res ipsa loquitur'6 when plaintiff cannot prove the
fact of the driver's falling asleep, even by permissible inference, and
"Both the "inference" rule and the matter of law rule apply only to ordinary,
as distinguished from gross or wanton, negligence. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,
289 P.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Bryan v. Bryan, 59 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1952); Ansback
v. Greenberg, 256 S.AV.d 1 (Ky. 1952); Belletete v. Morin, 322 Mass. 214, 76 N.E.2d
66o (1948); Butine v. Stevens, 319 Mich. 176, 29 N.W.2d 325 (1947).
"The term 'prima facie evidence' or 'prima facie case' is used in two senses,
and it is often difficult to detect which of these is intended in the judicial passage in
hand." 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed. 194o). The phrase may indicate the
point at which the opponent will have a verdict directed against him if he does not
discharge the duty of producing evidence which has shifted to him. Acting in this
fashion the term is used as equivalent to the notion of a presumption. In the
other sense in which it is used the phrase means that the proponent has intro-
duced evidence sufficient to justify an inference of negligence by the jury. Id. § 2494.
33 Words and Phrases 543-556 (Perm. ed. 1940) contains an excellent examination
of both usages.
1 Newell v. Riggins, 197 Va. 490, 90 S.E.2d 150 (1955); Lipscomb v. O'Brien, 181
Va. 471, 25 S.E.2d 261 (1943); Jones v. Pasco, 179 Va. 7, 18 S.W.2d 258 (1942); Lee
v. Moore, 168 Va. 278, 191 S.E. 589 (1937).
2Prosser, Torts § 32 (2d ed. 1955); 6 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 308 (1940); Annot., 28
A.L.R.2d 12 (195o.
'1Note 2 supra. See also Annot., 28 A.L.R. 2d 12 (1950); Annot., 138 A.L.R.
1385 (1942)-
'13Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Hunter, 41 Del. 336, 21 A.2d 286 (1941)-
"4This rule is based on the fact that "in a normal human being sleep does
not come without warning. Before sleep there is drowsiness and before drowsiness
there is usually great fatigue or at least a desire to sleep." Bernosky v. Greff, 350 Pa.
59, 38 A.2d 35, 36 (1944). For the best discussion of the medical basis for this rule
see Bushnell v. Bushnell, supra note 2, and Kaufman & Kantrowitz, The Case of the
Sleeping Motorist, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362 (1950); In addition see Kaplan v. Kaplan,
213 Iowa 646, 239 NAV. 682 (1931); Paulson v. Hanson, 226 Iowa 858, 285 N.W.
189 (1939); Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Self,, 20o Tenn. App. 498, 101 S.W.2d 132
(1935)-
'5 Brownell v. Freedman, 39 Ariz. 385, 6 P.2d 1115 (1935); Krantz v. Krantz, 211
Wis. 249, 248 N.W. 155 (1933). See also note 2 supra.
't Harper, Torts § 77 (1933); Prosser, Torts § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
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when the accident-causing instrumentality is within the exclusive
control of the defendant, and the accident is of such a nature that
it would not occur in the ordinary course of events if proper care
were used.17 So in such a jurisdiction an inference of negligence can
be drawn by the jury without plaintiff's proving, or even alleging, that
the operator fell asleep.
At this point the two views- res ipsa loquitur and "inference" of
negligence-become identical. The burden of producing evidence shifts
to the defendant, and if he attempts in any way to exonerate himself,
the jury must determine whether the inference of negligence has been
sufficiently rebutted.18
Although the "inference" rule has predominated in the courts,
some writers have concluded that the unconscious driver should be
absolutely liable,19 and "must, at [his] ... peril, stay sane and con-
scious .... -20 "There is then, an ultra-hazardous activity-not that of
driving an automobile, but that of remaining constantly capable of
driving."21 To substantiate this contention one writer had made an
analogy to a wild animal whose owner is absolutely liable for any
damage it may do. Following this analogy, "the driver of an automo-
bile knows that if he loses control, the heretofore 'domesticated' en-
gine becomes a 'wild' one, likely to do considerable harm." 22
Where sleeping drivers are involved the ultrahazardous activity
view and the "negligence as a matter of law rule" would be coinci-
dent. But the pervasiveness of the ultrahazardous doctrine would
include within its scope any unconscious driver even though his un-
consciousness may be the result of a heart attack or fainting, etc.23
"Druzanich v. Criley, '9 Cal. 2d 439, 122 P.2d 53 (1942); Thompson v. Kost, 298
Ky. 32, 181 S.V.2d 445 (1944); Collins v. McClure, 143 Ohio St. 569, 56 N.E.2d
171 (944).
"If the defendant makes no effort to introduce some evidence of due care
and the only legitimate inference to be drawn is that the operator was overcome
by sleep, some courts, instead of submitting the issue of negligence to the jury, will
direct a verdict for the plaintiff. Tennes v. Tennes, 32o Ill. App. i9, 5o N.E.2d 132
(1943); Hendler v. Meadows, 13 N.J. Misc. 684, i8o At. 399 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
"Perhaps it would have been for the best had our courts recognized the risk
of injury or death both to motorists and to other travellers, which experience has
shown to be inseparable from even careful driving, as sufficient to require of
those who use this new means o ftransportation, the burden of answering for even
unavoidable accidents." Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 5o Harv. L. Rev. 725, 727
(1937). See also Kaufman & Kantrowitz, supra note 13; note 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 199
(1958).
- Kaufman & Kantrowitz, supra note 14 at 368.
"Ibid.
" Note, 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 199, 205 (1958).
21See notes ig through 22, supra.
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Because of what the courts consider to be the harshness of this ap-
proach, the ultrahazardous activity view has remained almost entirely
within the province of the writers.24 Even under the Theisen decision
liability would be predicated on the presence of negligence on the
part of the vehicle's operator, and therefore, he would not be held
liable for damages caused by circumstances beyond his control.
Although the Theisen decision appears to be the first to promul-
gate the "negligence as a matter of law" doctrine in clear and unequi-
vocal terms, the language in several Michigan cases foreshadowed such
a rule.25 The Supreme Court of Michigan used more limited lan-
guage,26 and cited as authority previous decisions that had applied
the "inference" doctrine,27 as though no extension was intended.
The "inference" rule is based on the tacit assumption that under
certain circumstances a driver could conceivably fall asleep without
prior warning of the impending drowsiness and consequently, be ab-
solved of negligence.28 But in practice, the only successful rebuttal to
this inference of negligence has been proof that the driver's uncon-
scious condition was the result, not of sleep, but of some unforesee-
able extraneous circumstances. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
now boldly declared that nonculpable dozing simply does not exist.
The "inference" doctrine in reality relates to the unconscious, as
distinguished from the sleeping driver. The "negligence as a matter
of law" rule removes from the jury the issue of negligence where
drivers fall asleep.
WYATr B. DURRMTE
21The only instance in which the courts have adopted absolute liability where
an unconscious driver has been involved is Leary v. Oates, 84 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935).
2Trafamczak v. Anys, 320 Mich. 653, 31 N.W.2d 832 (1948); Reetz v. Schemansky,
278 Mich. 626, 26o N.V. 811 (1937); Perkins v. Roberts, 272 Mich. 545, 262 N.V.
3o5 (1935); Boos v. Sauer, 266 Mich. 230, 253 N.W. 278 (1934); Davlin v. Morse,
254 Mich. 114, 235 N.W. 812 (1931).
m"Sauer, then, was guilty of at least ordinary negligence." Boos v. Sauer,
Id. at 279. "Defendant was guilty of negligence." Perkins v. Roberts, Id. at 306.
"See Bushnell v. Bushnell and Whiddon v. Malone, supra note 2.
21"Sleep does not ordinarily come without some warning of its approach." 179
Va. at io, 18 S.E.2d at 259. "In any ordinary case, one cannot go to sleep while
driving an automobile without having relaxed the vigilance which the law
requires, without having been negligent." Bushnell v. Bushnell, supra note 2 at 435.
